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P A U L ,  H A R D S H I P S ,
A N D  S U F F E R I N G
David £. Fredrickson
I focus m y exam ination of suffering on  the concept of grief (A.ujrr|, type), w hich in 
the Greco-Roman w orld was w idely considered one type of passion. The Greek 
term  for passion (7id0o<;, pathos) denotes the self being acted upon  ra ther than act­
ing up o n  the external w orld. To suffer (ndayeiv, paschein) is to be m oved by exter­
nals .1 From the philosophic perspective, it m attered little w hether this m ovem ent 
was occasioned by grief or by the other m ain  types of passion (fear, pleasure, lust, 
and, in some sources, anger). This association of suffering w ith  passion in general, 
though correct, w ould  indicate too broad a range of inquiry. For practical reasons, 
therefore, I lim it this investigation to w hat English-speakers norm ally m ean by 
suffering—em otional pain or grief.2 Furtherm ore, I h ighlight aspects of the an­
cient discourse about grief that bear directly on the interpretation of P aul's letters: 
som e pertinent forms of grief, hardships and hardsh ip  lists, the role of grief in 
m oral reform ation; tw o ancient letter types that m ake grief thematic; and the no­
tion of shared suffering in friendship.
P art I. Hardships and Suffering 
in G reco-R om an Philosophy and Epistolography
T h e  Psychology o f  S uffering
Grief as irrational contraction (auGToA.fi, systole) of the soul or heart is a com m on­
place in Stoic psychology (Diogenes Laertius 7.111,118; SVF 1.51.26-31; 3.94.14- 
15; 3.95.17-18, 24-25, 41-43; Epictetus, frg. 9; Plutarch, Lib. aegr. 1,7) .3 Cicero 
show s that the m etaphor of grief as soul shrinkage w as so well established in  
Greek w riters that it survived the translation of philosophical term s into Latin: 
"Distress [aegritudo] then is a new ly form ed belief of present evil, the subject of 
w hich thinks it right to feel depression and shrinking of soul [ileinitti contrahique
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animo]” (Cicero, Tusc. 4.14; cf. Tusc. 1.90; 3.83; 4.66-67; Quint, fratr. 1.1.4; Seneca, 
Ep. 99.15). Some of the varieties of grief im ply the idea of contraction. For exam ­
ple, groaning (oxevaypdg, stenagmos) conveys the notion of contraction in the root 
cxev (sten; see Rom 8:23, 26; 2 Cor 5:2,4) .4 Soul shrinkage accounts in the philoso­
phers for the experience of grief at its m ost fundam ental level.5
N ot all types of em otional pain, however, exhibit contraction of soul. One 
such variety of grief often treated by the philosophers was regret (pexapeAeia, 
mctameleia), a particularly sharp form  of suffering. The standard  definition of re­
gret was "grief over sins done as though happening through one's ow n self."6 
W hat m akes regret so painful is self-hatred and self-condemnation: "Regret is a 
factious passion of the soul w hich brings unhappiness, for to the extent that the 
one is encom passed by regrets and is grieved at the things w hich have happened, 
to this degree he is angry at himself, since he became the cause of these things" 
(SVF 3.149.20-24; m y translation). According to Plutarch, the soul that regrets a 
deed is filled w ith no other thought than "how  it m ight escape from  the m em ory 
of its iniquities, drive out of itself the consciousness of guilt, regain its purity, and 
begin life anew " (Plutarch, Sera 556A). Such persons condem n their lives, feel re­
morse, hate themselves, and are distressed over w hat they have done (Plutarch, 
Sera 566E). The notion that, as Seneca pu t it, "he w ho has sinned has already p u n ­
ished himself," echoed throughout ancient w ritings (Seneca, Ira 2.30.2).7 Seneca 
com m ents further that "no m an is more heavily punished than he w ho is con­
signed to the torture of remorse" (Seneca, Ira 3.26.2).
Philosophers used the notion of self-condem nation to explain the nature of 
regret. Aristotle formalized a connection probably found already in  everyday 
speech: "But a good m an does not rebuke him self either at the time, like the un ­
controlled, nor yet his form er self his later, like the penitent [6 peTapeA/rynKoi;, ho 
metameletikos] . . . because w hen men blam e them selves they are pu tting  them ­
selves to death" (Aristotle, Eth. end. 7.6.14-15; m odified translation).
Plutarch draw s out the analogy betw een regret and punishm ent. Like prison­
ers sentenced to death, every w icked m an suffers "terrors, forebodings, and the 
pangs of remorse" (pexapeAefoo;, mctameleias; Plutarch, Sera 554E-F). H e also 
w rites that w hen "despots . . .  desire to m ake m iserable those w hom  they punish, 
[they] m aintain executioners and torturers, or devise branding-irons and  wedges; 
vice . . .  fills the m an w ith grief and lam entation, dejection and  rem orse" (juexape- 
Xeiaq, mctameleias; Plutarch, An vit. 498D; cf. Sera 554A-B). Consciousness of a sin 
"leaves behind it in the soul regret [pe'capeA.eiav, metameleian] w hich ever contin­
ues to w ound and prick it. For the other pangs reason does aw ay w ith, b u t regret 
[pexavovav, m etanoian] is caused by reason itself, since the soul, together w ith  its 
feeling of sham e, is stung and chastised by itself" (Plutarch, Tranq. an. 476E-477B; 
cf. Gen. Socr. 592A-B).
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This understand ing  of regret in juridical m etaphors occurred frequently in 
discussions of conscience and repentance .8 Writers used courtroom  im agery for 
the self-exam ination of conscience (Seneca, Ira 3.36.3; Juvenal, Sat. 13.2-3). The 
notion of a self-im posed sentence of death  figures prom inently: "genuine repen­
tance is utterly  to root out of the soul the sins for w hich a m an has condem ned 
him self to death" (Clement of Alexandria, Quis div. 39; cf. Strom. 4.22.143).
H ard sh ip s  a n d  H a rd s h ip  Lists
The w ork  of John T. Fitzgerald on hardships and  hardsh ip  lists in ancient m oral 
philosophy has proven to be a rich resource for students of the Pauline epistles .9 
He sum m arizes w hat w riters had  in m ind w hen  recounting hardships:
The intim ate connection betw een v irtue and  adversity has been thor­
oughly docum ented in the preceding pages. Since peristaseis [difficulties] 
constitute a test of hum an  character, they have both a revelatory and a 
dem onstrative function. The m an w ith  little or no integrity collapses 
u nder the w eight of his burdens. His peristaseis reveal and prove his defi­
ciencies as a person. The proficiens [one w ho makes progress], by contrast, 
show s greater strength of character in dealing w ith  his hardships, so that 
his peristaseis reveal his progress, w hat he is becoming. Since they help to 
form  his character, they play a crucial role in his paideia [education]. For 
the sapiens [wise man], however, peristaseis no longer have this educative 
character. They provide the proof that he is educated. Consequently, they 
exhibit w ho he is, w hat he has become?0
Fitzgerald has accounted for tw o functions of the philosophic discourse about 
hardships. First, the philosophers taught that reason is superior to all the vicissi­
tudes of life, and  because the self is identified w ith  reason, nothing external can 
cause harm .11 H ardships provide an opportunity  for this lesson to be illustrated in 
an actual life .12 Second, by the tim e of Paul, m ost philosophers had  abandoned the 
absolute distinction betw een the w ise m an and  the fool and had settled on a doc­
trine of progress in m oral v irtue .13 The notion that hardships train  the proficiens 
(one w ho m akes progress) in virtue and that suffering produces character in the 
one striving for w isdom  had  w idespread appeal.11
We have seen that hardships dem onstrate the sage's virtue or train the person 
aspiring to the serenity of the sage. There w as yet a third function of representing 
the sage's endurance: to dem onstrate his philanthropy (Epictetus, Diatr. 2.12.17- 
25; Lucian, Peregr. 18). Reminiscent of Antisthenes' depiction of O dysseus's dan ­
gers (Antisthenes, frg. 15.1-3, 9) , 15 Dio C hrysostom  distinguishes him self from 
philosophers w ho refused to associate w ith  the crow d and face danger: "For some 
am ong that com pany do not appear in public at all and prefer not to m ake the
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venture, possibly because they despair of being able to im prove the m asses" (Dio 
Chrysostom , Alex. 8 ; cf. Alex. 24; 1 Tars. 15).16 The genuine philosopher "stands 
ready, if need be, to subm it to ridicule and to the disorder and  the uproar of the 
m ob" (Dio Chrysostom, Alex. 32.11). He should be com pared w ith  Diogenes, 
w hose free speech was often not endured  (Dio Chrysostom, Isthm. 9.7-9) .17
G r ie f  an d  M o ra l R efo rm atio n
H arsh  Cynic philosophers regarded m oral failure as justification for causing grief 
(A.wtr|, lype) (Ps.-Socrates, Ep. 24; Lucian, Pise. 20) .18 From a text representing harsh  
Cynicism, w e learn that the laughter of Dem ocritus aim ed to condem n hum anity  
for its foolishness .19 N ot regarding laughter a strong enough m easure against 
hum an  vice, however, Dem ocritus w ished "to  discover som ething even m ore 
painful [Xwrripov, lyperon] to use against them " (Ps.-Hippocrates, Ep. 17.45 [Her- 
cher, Epistolographi Graeci 304, m y translation]). Cynic m oral reproof w as often 
painful because it w as inopportune (Ps.-Hippocrates, Ep. 17.19-20,34). H ippocra­
tes protests that D em ocritus's laughter at others' m isfortunes does not consider 
the circum stances of those he mocks (Ps.-Hippocrates, Ep. 17.20-21). Likewise, 
Plutarch denounces those w ho cause suffering w hen the circum stances of the 
hearer dem and encouragem ent and  consolation (Plutarch, Adul. amic. 69A).
In response to these criticisms, some Cynics sought to place their frank speak­
ing in a better light by stressing philanthropic aim s (Plutarch, Virt. mor. 452D; Sto- 
baeus, Flor. 3.13.42).20 They claimed that although w ords of tru th  are som etimes 
painful, in the end they are beneficial, because they are not m otivated by hatred 
bu t by a desire to heal others (Seneca, Vit. beat. 26.5). It is the du ty  of the philoso­
pher to benefit others, even if this requires a painful dose of truth-telling (Epicte­
tus, Diatr. 3.1.10-11; cf. Dio Chrysostom , Alex. 5, 7,11; Lucian, Hermot. 51).
In his introduction to Epictetus's Discourses, A rrian testifies to the concept of 
appropriate suffering in the reception of m oral exhortation:
Fie was clearly aim ing at nothing else bu t to incite the m inds of the hear­
ers to the best things. If, now, these w ords of his should produce that 
same effect, they w ould  have, I think, just that success w hich the w ords 
of philosophers ought to have; but if not, let those w ho read them  be as­
sured of this, that w hen Epictetus him self spoke them , the hearer could 
not help bu t feel [naoxetv, paschcin] exactly w hat Epictetus w anted him  to 
feel [rtocSeTv, pathein]. (Arriani epistula ad Lucium Gellium 5-7)
Epictetus him self com pared the lecture hall of the philosopher to a hospital, 
from w hich students should not walk ou t in  pleasure "bu t in pain" (Epictetus, 
Diatr. 3.23.30; cf. 3.1.10-11; 3.23.37).21
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The role of pain  in  m oral im provem ent w as controversial. For the Epicureans, 
em otional pain  (A/6nr|, lype) w as som ething to be avoided, because tranquillity, 
the goal of Epicurean m utual exhortation, w as the opposite of grief.22 In their 
view, pain  w as a sign of m isapplied or m isunderstood frank speech (Philodemus, 
Lib. 12,13, 31, 61-62, XVA, XVIB, XXIIB). This Epicurean judgm ent is not far re­
m oved from  the position of the earlier Stoics, w ho argued against the usefulness 
of pain  in m oral transform ation. They considered regret over one's errors a char­
acteristic of the bad person (SVF 3.100.33; 3.149.18-24; 3.150.24-27). The later Sto­
ics, on the other hand , em phasized progress in the m oral life and m itigated the 
absolute distinction betw een the wise m an and  the fool.23 In this context, grief 
over one's errors was a good thing—the beginning of the m oral life and a sign of 
progress (Cicero, Amic. 90; Lucian, Nigr. 4, 35; Plutarch, Virt. prof. 82C).
P lutarch illustrates the function of grief in m oral transform ation w hen he de­
scribes the w ay students should listen to the frank speech of philosophers .21 Al­
though  cow ardly grief is to be avoided, the student has to feel som e pain (Plu­
tarch, Rec. rat. and. 46C). The studen t m ust see that the teacher's speech aim s to 
reform  character. A dm onitions should be allow ed to penetrate like a biting drug 
and  cause hum iliation, sw eating, and dizziness, and a burn ing  w ith  sham e in the 
soul (Plutarch, Rec. rat. and. 46D). Yet Plutarch does not w an t the s tuden t to  expe­
rience excessive grief:
For this reason he w ho is taken to task m ust feel and suffer som e sm art, 
yet he should  no t be crushed or d ispirited, but, as though at a solem n rite 
of novitiate w hich consecrates him  to philosophy, he should subm it to the 
initial purifications and  com m otions, in  the expectation that som ething 
delectable and splendid  will follow upon  his present distress and  pertu r­
bation. (Plutarch, Rec. rat. and. 47A)
G r ie f  a n d  E p is to lary  Theo ry
In the epistolary handbook of Ps.-Libanius (fourth-sixth centuries c.E.) w e dis­
cover the following definition of the grieving style: "The grieving style is that in 
w hich w e present ourselves as being grieved ."25 M ore instructive is his sam ple 
letter:
The letter of grief [A'onri'UKfi, Lypetike]. You caused m e extremely m uch 
grief [AeA,'U7tr|Kaq, lelypekas] w hen you d id  this thing. For that reason I am 
very m uch vexed w ith  you, and bear a grief [Twtouiaca A,U7ir|v, lypoumai 
lypen] that is difficult to assuage. For the grief [Awioa, lypai] m en cause 
their friends is exceedingly difficult to heal, and holds in greater insults 
than  those they receive from their enemies. (Ps.-Libanius, Charact. Ep. 90, 
in M alherbe, Ancient Epistolary Theorists, 80-81)
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The grieving style has overtones of rebuke (Gregory of N azianzus, Ep. 40.1-4; 
Basil, Ep. 44.1) .26 Friendship language calls attention to the unexpected pain the 
w riter has suffered at the hands of his friend and thereby increases the force of the 
rebuke.
Two letters attributed to Demosthenes, both of doubtful authenticity, exhibit 
the grieving style. In Epistle 2, Dem osthenes com plains to the council and assem ­
bly of the unfair treatm ent he has received. The letter is full of indignation and re­
proach (Demosthenes, Ep. 2.1, 3, 8 , 12). Dem osthenes portrays him self as grief- 
stricken over the wrongs he has received from his readers (Demosthenes, Ep. 
2.13, 21-22). N ear the conclusion of the letter, he expresses his suffering one last 
time:
Let not one of you think, m en of Athens, that through lack of m anhood 
or from any other base m otive I give w ay to m y grief from the beginning 
to the end of this letter. N ot so, bu t every m an is ungrudgingly  indulgent 
to the feeling of the m om ent, and those that now  beset m e—if only this 
had never come to pass!—are sorrow s and tears [A-unca Kai S&Kpua, lypai 
kai dakrya], longing both for m y country and for you, and pondering over 
the wrongs I have suffered, all of w hich cause m e to grieve. (Demos­
thenes, Ep. 2.25; cf. Ep. 3.44)
Notice especially Dem osthenes' reference to his tears and  the rebuke they com ­
m unicate .27
The conciliatory letter was another epistolary type that m ade suffering the­
matic. According to Ps.-Libanius, the conciliatory style was appropriate w hen the 
w riter had  grieved the letter's  recipient: "The conciliatory style is that in  w hich 
w e conciliate som eone w ho has been caused grief by us for som e reason. Some 
also call this the apologetic style" (Ps.-Libanius, Charnct. Ep. 19, in  M alherbe, An­
cient Epistolary Theorists, 68-69). As the exam ple below will illustrate, the w riter 
does not deny that he had  caused the recipient pain. In fact, he acknowledges the 
pain his w ords had  inflicted. H e does, however, assert that causing pain  had not 
been his intention. Furtherm ore, even if pain d id  arise, its real significance, so it 
is asserted, is the healing that it bestow ed in the end:
The conciliatory letter. In addition  to m aking the statem ents that I did, I 
w ent on (to p u t them) into action, for I m ost certainly d id  not think that 
they w ould  ever cause you sorrow  [\mr|0fjGeG0ai, lypethesesthai]. But if 
you w ere upset by w hat was said or done, be assured, m ost excellent sir, 
that I shall m ost certainly no longer m ention w hat w as said. For it is my 
aim  always to heal my friends ra ther than to cause them  sorrow  [A.vrceTv, 
lypeiti]. (Ps.-Libanius, Charnct. Ep. 6 6 , in M alherbe, Ancient Epistolary The­
orists, 76-77)
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T he conciliatory letter reflects the philosophic teaching concerning the reform ing 
pow er of grief b rough t on by bold  w ords u ttered  in friendship (Cicero, Quint, 
fratr. 1.2.12-13; G regory of N azianzus, Epp. 17.1-3; 59.1-4).
Shared S uffering  a n d  Friendship
The notion of friends sharing suffering w as not the invention of philosophers. 
"Suppose the m isfortunes of friends to be your own," M enander w rote, echoing 
w h a t w e can assum e to be a w idespread  opin ion .28 Yet the philosophers explored 
shared suffering in  friendship and, significantly, set lim its upon  it.
Aristotle recognizes as a friend "one w ho shares his friend 's joys and  sor­
row s" (Aristotle, Eth. nic. 9.4.1). Furtherm ore, he points ou t that suffering is in­
deed  "ligh tened  by the sym pathy of friends" (Aristotle, Eth. nic. 9.10.2; cf. Cicero, 
Amic. 22). Aristotle hesitates to answ er definitively w hether the pain  is actually 
shared, or w hether it is sim ply the pleasure of com rades' com pany and  "con­
sciousness of their sym pathy” that m itigates pain. He does m aintain, however, 
tha t it is "w om anish" for one person  to allow another to share in  pain  (Aristotle, 
Eth. nic. 9.11.4).
Later w riters enforce a sim ilar lim itation. O n the one hand, it is necessary to 
risk danger on account of friendship (Cicero, Amic. 23; Plutarch, Amic. mult. 96A; 
Lucian, Tax. 7 ,9). Yet shared  suffering m ust no t go so deep as to  touch the soul of 
the friend w ho gives com fort (Epictetus, Ench. 16.1). It is also problem atic 
w hether a friend should  share in  ano ther 's  d isrepute (Cicero, Amic. 61), a lthough 
som e w riters believe this to be the case w ith  true friends (Plutarch, Amic. mult. 
96B; Lucian, Tox. 46; M axim us of Tyre, Or. 14.5). In  spite of these lim its im posed 
by som e philosophers, w e find the com plete sharing of adversity, even pain, sor­
row, and  grief, to be a com m onplace pertain ing to friendship  (Cicero, Amic. 4 6 - 
48). In  fact, according to Lucian this sharing is the first thing that m ust be said 
about friendship (Lucian, Tox. 6 ). The ground for such a no tion is that friendship 
is a k ind  of sharing, that friends have all things in  com m on (Seneca, Epp. 6.2; 
48.2-4; Them istius, Or. 22.269, 270, 274).
The ultim ate dem onstration of friendship w as w illingly to suffer death  for an ­
other (Diogenes Laertius 10.120; Plutarch, Amic. mult. 96C-D; Lucian, Tox. 20,36- 
37; M axim us of Tyre, Or. 14.3).29 Cicero reports that theatergoers w ere m oved to 
standing  ovation at scenes of such devotion (Cicero, Amic. 24), and  w e know  from 
literary sources that the them e of death  for friendship 's sake w as gaining great 
popularity  in  the first century b.c .e.30 Again, however, there w as a limit. The one 
for w hom  suffering and  death  are endured  m ust be good. This qualification is 
based on the requirem ent that a friendship be established only w ith  the good per­
son. Friendship is possible only after testing to see if the potential friend pos­
sesses v irtue (Cicero, Amic. 79, 85).
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P art II. Hardships and Suffering in Paul's Letters 
(2 Corinthians 1-7; Romans 5:1-1 I; and 8:18-39)
G r ie f  a n d  th e  Occasion o f  2  C orin th ians 1 - 7
Second Corinthians 1-7  is full of references to suffering and  hardships. Paul's ac­
know ledgm ent of the suffering of the Corinthian com m unity opens (1:3-7) and 
closes (7:8-11) this portion of the letter. References to Paul's ow n suffering are fit­
ted  betw een the portrayals of the church 's grief in tw o ways. First, he narrates his 
travel from Asia M inor into M acedonia (1:8—11; 2:12-16; 7:5-6). It is a journey of 
woe. Second, Paul em ploys the philosophic convention of hardsh ip  lists (4:7-12; 
4:16-5:5; and 6:3-10). O ur current task is twofold: to reconstruct the occasion of 
2 Cor 1-7 and to understand  its rhetorical strategy, using w hat w e know  about the 
ancient w ays of speaking about suffering and hardships. We treat the occasion 
first.
In 2 Cor 2:4, Paul refers to a letter w hich has been nam ed appropriately "the 
letter of tears": "For out of m uch affliction [0A.U|/eoo<;, thlipseds] and contraction of 
heart [ouvoxn? KapSiaq, synoches kardias] 1 w rote to you through m any tears" (8 ta  
noXk(£)V S a K p u c o v , din pollen dakrydn, m y translation). This letter w as a critical event 
betw een the w riting  of 1 and  2 C orinthians .31 Paul had  m ade an em ergency visit 
to Corinth to deal w ith  the troubles in  the church .32 D uring this interm ediate visit, 
an  individual injured or insulted Paul (2 Cor 1:15, 23; 2:1—11; 7:12; 12:21-13:2).33 
The identity of this individual is unknow n, bu t in the secondary literature he is 
frequently called 6  dSiKfjoac; (ho adikesas, "the one w ho caused injury") after 2 Cor 
7:12. After Paul left Corinth, he w rote a letter that rebuked the church for not tak­
ing disciplinary action against "the one w ho caused injury ."34
O ur know ledge of the grieving style in ancient epistolography (see above) al­
low s us to see the rebuking function of this letter and to assess its im pact on the 
C orinthian community. Paul portrayed him self as w eeping and m ade his grief the 
stated  m otivation for writing. As w e have seen, shrinking soul is a com m onplace 
in Stoic psychology, in w hich expressions sim ilar to Paul's "affliction and contrac­
tion of the heart" signify grief. We also know  from 2 Cor 7: 8  that this letter caused 
pain  to the congregation at Corinth.
There is m ore evidence that the pain caused by this letter w as a factor in the 
occasion of 2 Cor 1-7. M any scholars agree that 6:11-13 states Paul's reconciling 
purpose in w riting  2 Cor 1-7, although a full appreciation of his use of the psy­
chology of suffering has no t accom panied this correct insight .35 In 6:11, Paul refers 
to his frank speech w ith  the phrase "our m outh  stands open tow ard yo u ."36 He 
then  places his bold speech in  the context of friendship. P aul's friendship for the 
Corinthians is indicated by the joy that accom panies his speech. Joy, understood 
by the philosophers as the opposite of grief, w as often depicted as a w idening of
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the heart (SVF 3.105.17-18; Seneca, Ep. 59.2). In 6:12, Paul reiterates his joy for the 
Corinthians by denying that they are the cause of any grief to him. Reflecting the 
philosophic definition of grief as soul shrinkage, he says that the church is not re­
stricted (aTevo%copeTa0e, stenochdreisthe) in his heart, even as he, as a friend, uses 
frank speech in m oral adm onition. Yet in 6:12b, Paul points out the narrow ness in 
the church 's affections tow ard him, and he exhorts his hearers to return  his 
friendship by w idening their hearts so that he m ight exist there. Shrinking soul 
covered a range of suffering, including annoyance. Indeed, the term s Paul em ­
ploys to depict the church 's a ttitude tow ard him  in 6:11-13 are rem iniscent of the 
definition of annoyance (Diogenes Laertius 7.111; SVF 3.100.29; Plutarch, Sera 
564B-C; Seneca, Dial. 2.10.2-3; Ira 2.6.1; M arcus Aurelius 9.32).
So far, we have accounted for tw o w ays in w hich the issue of suffering con­
tributed to the occasion of 2 Cor 1-7. Paul suffered grief over the com m unity 's in­
difference to the injury that he had  received, and the congregation was grieved at 
being rebuked by Paul through the letter of tears. A nother grief m ust be consid­
ered as well. In 2 Cor 2:5-11, Paul skillfully m inim izes the w rong that "the one 
w ho caused injury" had  done to him  and pleads w ith  the congregation to affirm 
love for the m an. Apparently, the "letter of tears" had w orked too well. The Co­
rin thian  congregation had  disciplined the offender too harshly, and now, alien­
ated from the community, he suffered from excessive grief, possibly in danger of 
suicide. Paul's plea in 2:5-11 for the com m unity to exhort, love, and  forgive him 
parallels the philosophical concern for appropriate grief in the context of m oral 
reformation.
To appreciate the grief "the one w ho caused injury" experienced, attention 
m ust be given to  the term  ertrag ia  (epitimia) in 2:6. H ere envugia is synonym ous 
w ith  enm priau; (epitimesis, "rebuke").37 Rebuke w as defined as a type of m oral ex­
hortation (Isocrates, Demon. 1.38; Dio Chrysostom , Alex. 33; Lucian, Demon. 55; 
Jupp. trag. 23; Fug. 12; Pseuclol. 3; Stobaeus, Flor. 3.13.42).38 Philo draw s up  a list of 
the salu tary  form s of m oral discourse:
If I speak in the general assembly I will leave all talk of flattery to others 
and  resort only to such as is salu tary  and  beneficial, reproving [enragwv, 
epitimon], w arning, correcting in  w ords studied to shew a sober frankness 
w ithout foolish and  frantic arrogance. (Philo, Ios. 73; cf. Cicero, Off.
1.38.137; Seneca, Ep. 94.39; C lem ent of A lexandria, Paed. 1.9.75.1;
1.9.77.1 )39
Striking is the inclusion of encouragem ent and com fort in the contexts in 
w hich rebuke is treated as a type of m oral exhortation (Plutarch, Superst. 168C; 
Lucian, Demon. 7; C lem ent of Alexandria, Paed. 1.9.75.1; 1.9.87.2; Seneca, Ira 1.15.1; 
Ep. 99.32; Ps.-Dem etrius, Form. Ep. 6 ; Julian, Or. 6.201 C). Because the final goal of
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rebuke was m oral im provem ent, once sham e and grief had  taken hold and repen­
tance had been brought about, w ords of encouragem ent and  com fort w ere to be 
added  lest excessive suffering lead to alienation and even death  (Plutarch, [Lib. 
ed.] 13D-E).10 This is P aul's stated fear, and  exhortation and affirm ation of friend­
ship is the rem edy he pleads for the church to em ploy for the sake of the now 
grief-stricken "one w ho caused injury."
One last grief rem ains to be described. It is Paul's ow n grief, suffered as he 
m ade his w ay from  Asia M inor to M acedonia in  order to receive from  Titus new s 
of the congregation's reaction to the severe rebuke in the letter of tears: "We do 
not w ant you to be unaw are, brothers and  sisters, of the affliction [0A.f\|/ecog, 
thlipseos] w e experienced in Asia; for we w ere so utterly, unbearably crushed that 
we despaired of life itself" (2 Cor 1:8). Paul exaggerates his suffering for rhetori­
cal purposes, w hich w e will explore m ore fully below .41 It is enough here to p in ­
point the exact nature of the affliction.
In 1:9, Paul indicates to his hearers that he suffered from regret. He had 
passed the "sentence of death" ( t o  oaiOKpipa t o o  Gavaxou, to apokrima tou thmm- 
tou) upon himself. We have learned that the m etaphor of self-condem nation was 
a com m on way of speaking about regret, a variety of grief. Second Corinthians 7:8 
confirms that the em otion he describes in 1:9 is regret: "For even if I grieved 
[eXtmriaa, elypesa] you w ith m y letter, I do not regret [gexa|ie/\,o|iai, metamelonmi] 
it, though I did regret [pexa|xeX6|J.r|V, metamelomen] it, for I see that I grieved [eA.x>- 
rtrioev, ehjpesen] you w ith  that letter, though only briefly." The philosophical u n ­
derstanding of regret as self-condem nation allows us to connect chapters 1 and  7. 
Some of Paul's references to his pain in the intervening passages (2:13; 4:8-11; 
7:4-7), w hich otherw ise m ight be understood as allusions to the general suffer­
ings of an  apostle, can be seen as the regret he claims to have suffered after w rit­
ing the letter of tears.
S uffering  in th e  R hetorica l S trategy o f  2  C orin th ians 1 - 7
Having pointed out the w ay grief sets the stage for the letter, w e turn  now  to Paul's 
rhetorical strategy w ithin the letter itself. Paul adopts and adapts philosophic and 
epistolographic conventions to reconcile the Corinthian community, who had been 
stung by rebuke in the letter of tears. Paul em ploys four aspects of the ancient dis­
course about suffering: the notion that friends share both joy and sorrow; the epis­
tolographic conventions of the conciliatory letter; the idea of appropriate grief in 
the reception of moral exhortation; and the endurance of hardships.
Second Corinthians 1:3-7 develops the notion that friends share both joy and 
suffering. The key term  that connects Paul's rhetoric w ith  the philosophic d is­
course about suffering is xoc 7ia 0 i)|iaxct (ta pathemata):
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1:5: the sufferings (to: 7xa0 f||_iaTce, ta pathemata) of Christ abound in us 
1 :6 : the same sufferings (naOrpaTcov, pathematon) w hich we ourselves 
have (ndoxogev, paschomen)
1:7: partners in the sufferings (koivcovoi eoxe toov mBrpaTcov, koinonoi este 
ton pathematori, my translation)
Shared suffering is the necessary condition for true friendship. This goes to 
the heart of traditional teaching on friendship. Christ, Paul, and the church are 
one because they share em otions. N ot only did  this identity of em otions provide 
the ground for friendship, it also defined its task (Plutarch, Adul. antic. 49F; Antic, 
mult. 95F-96D; Dio Chrysostom , 3 Regn. 3.100-103; Gnomologium Vaticanum 273; 
Cicero, Amic. 48, 64; Seneca, Ep. 6.3). Friends w ere to share sorrow, or in the Paul­
ine idiom  in 2 Cor 1:3-7, to share in affliction (0Xu|ac;, thlipsis). It is no surprise, 
then, that in  1:7 Paul uses the key term  for this sharing of em otion in friendship: 
Koivcovfa (koinonia) (Aristotle, Eth. nic. 8.9.1; 8.12.1; 9.12.1; Eth. eud. 7.9.1; Plutarch, 
Amic. mult. 96D; Lucian, Tox. 6-7; Julian, Or. 8.240A-B; 241C).42
Second C orinthians 1:3 -7 underscores the friendship that Paul claims exists 
betw een the com m unity and himself. Sharing suffering is proof that they are 
friends. H ere Paul does not call attention to the fact that he caused the com m unity 
its grief. The vocabulary of suffering is vague enough to allow Paul to categorize 
the sting of rebuke felt by the church and  his ow n regret to be categorized under 
the sam e term s. Later in the letter (beginning in 2:1-4 and  culm inating in 7:9-10) 
Paul deals directly w ith  the pain he caused, characterizing it as appropriate grief.
Before exploring that strategy in detail, however, w e need to exam ine the 
w ays 2 Cor 1-7 exhibits characteristics of the conciliatory letter. First, stating one's 
regret for acting offensively or having w ritten in severe tones w as an elem ent in 
the letter of reconciliation (Cicero, Quint, fratr. 1.2.12-13; Chariton, Chaer. 4.4; Phi- 
lostratus, Vit. soph. 562-563; Fronto, Ad M. Ceas. 5.59).n Paul m akes such state­
m ents in 1:8-9 and 7:8. Second, Paul follows the conventions of the conciliatory 
letter by saying that the intention of his rebuke w as not to  cause pain  b u t to 
dem onstrate his friendship (2:4 and 7:3; see above). Finally, Paul claims that the 
intent and the effect of his severe w ords w ere to prom ote healing. In 7:8-12, Paul 
reviews for his readers the salutary effects of the rebuke conveyed in the grieving 
letter. Behind these verses stands the topos that a friend does not intend his frank 
speech to cause pain bu t to bring about repentance and  m oral healing. The pro­
gression in 7:9-10 from grief to repentance and then to salvation places Paul's 
characterization of his treatm ent of the church squarely in  the psychagogic trad i­
tion (see above).
The distinction betw een godly grief and w orldly grief in 7 :9 b -lla  further 
dem onstrates Paul's use of the Greco-Roman tradition of soul-care in order to jus­
tify the severity of the grieving letter. Godly grief and  the grief of the w orld w ere
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distinguished in their effects: repentance leading to salvation on the one hand, 
and  death  on the other.44 Plutarch contrasts the grief that God inflicts w ith  the 
pain caused by hum ans. God causes pain  in order to bring about repentance; h u ­
m ans sim ply punish  w ithout a view to m oral im provem ent (Plutarch, Sera 
551C-E).45 Moreover, unlike hum ans w ho get angry, cause pain, and then regret 
their severity (Plutarch, Cohib. ira 464C-D; Sera 550E-F; 551C; Seneca, Ira 2.6.2), 
God know s no rem orse and causes no dam age (Philo, Cotif. 171). In 7:9, Paul 
claims that godly grief caused by the grieving letter did  the church no dam age.
We have m oved from the epistolographic conventions of 2 Cor 1-7 to the 
philosophical topos of appropriate em otional pain in the context of m oral exhor­
tation. This is natural, because the rhetoric of conciliation draw s from the philo­
sophic tradition of soul-care. Paul had already invoked the notion of appropriate 
grief in 2:5-11 and em phasized that the grief inflicted by m oral adm onition 
should be com bined w ith exhortation and  affirm ations of friendship. He reiter­
ates this them e in 7:2-4, only now  to am eliorate the suffering he had caused the 
church. In 7:3a, he denies that his speech aim s to condem n his readers (Jtpo<; 
KaxdKpiciv on Xeyoo, pros katakrisin ou lego).46 The uses of frank speech for m oral 
edification, on the one hand, and condem nation, on the other, w ere well-know n 
(Stobaeus, Flor. 3.13.63; Isocrates, Paneg. 4.130; 8.72; Philodem us, Lib. 37-38, IB; 
Lucian, Pseudol. 3; Dear. cone. 2; Icar. 30; Ps.-Diogenes, Ep. 29.2-3; M arcus Aurelius
11.6.2.).47 As we have seen, harsh  Cynics w ere well-know n for their unbrid led  use 
of free speech to condem n the ills of hum ankind. Dem ocritus's laughter con­
dem ned hum anity  for its inconsistency (Ps.-PIippocrates, Ep. 17.40). The notion of 
the philosopher's rebuke of sin as the guilty verdict in a legal proceeding is found 
in Cynic self-description (Ps.-Heraclitus, Epp. 7.2; 9.8; Gnomologium Vaticanum 
116,487). Similarly, the harsh  Cynic understood bold speech as punishm ent of 
hum an error (Ps.-Diogenes, Ep. 29.1, 4; Ps.-Socrates, Ep. 12; Ps.-Heraclitus, Epp. 
7A; 9.3; Plutarch, [Vit. X orat.] 842D; Epictetus, Diatr. 3.22.94, 97-98; Dio Chrysos­
tom, Is thru. 8).
Paul distances him self from these harsh  practitioners of frank speech by op­
posing the excessive grief their w ords inflict. This brings us to the last of his 
rhetorical strategies in 2 Cor 1-7. Paul uses hardship  lists to shape his im age as a 
bold-speaking friend w hose chief concerns are reconciliation and the salvation of
his hearers.
In order to understand  how  the hardships in 4:7-15 shape Paul's image, I first 
consider his reliance on God and abasem ent for the sake of the church. Second 
Corinthians 4:5-6 anticipates the hardships in 4:7-15 by raising the issue of the 
source of Paul's authority. H e claims no t to preach him self b u t Jesus Christ as 
Lord, and  him self as the church 's slave. The hardships in 4:7-15 am plify these 
tw o claims. They depict the free and bold-speaking Paul, w ho nevertheless relies
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entirely on God, not his ow n virtue, and w ho subordinates him self to the Corin­
thian congregation.
An am biguity  in 4:7 prepares the reader to m ove from the them e of God as 
source of pow er (4:8-9) to Paul's abasem ent for the sake of the church (4:10-15). 
O n the one hand , the term  Griaccupo^ (thesauros, "treasure") suggests P aul's illu­
m ined and  transform ed soul.48 The phrase " in  earthen vessels" evokes the 
fragility of his ou ter self in  anticipation of 4:16-5:5, and  the "transcendent pow er" 
points to G od 's pow er to preserve the fragile Paul in  the m idst of hardships.49 On 
the o ther hand, "treasure" could also refer to P aul's ministry. Then earthen pot­
tery denotes the abasem ent he accepts for the sake of the church,50 and "transcen­
den t pow er" evokes the life-giving pow er of Paul's m inistry.51 The am biguity of 
4:7 reflects the correlation of the salvation Paul has received from God and  G od 's 
salvation of hum anity  through P aul's m inistry (cf. 1:4; 4:1; 5:18-19).
The catalog of hardships in 4:8-9 illustrates the dangers of Paul's ministry, his 
endurance, and, m ost of all, his source of pow er—God.52 That Paul's pow er de­
rives no t from  him self bu t from God distinguishes him  from the w ise m an whose 
authority  depends upon  his ability to m ake all things depend upon  himself. By 
m aking him self dependent upon  God in this way, Paul prepares for his self-pres­
entation as a reconciler.
The hardships in 4:10-15, however, po int no longer to Paul's G od-given 
pow er to endure difficulties bu t to endurance of ignom iny and  death  for the sake 
of the church. Paul now  becomes a suffering bold-speaker w hose concern is the 
salvation of the church. The purpose clauses in 4:10-11 suggest the vo luntary  na­
ture of P aul's suffering. Moreover, if Jiapa8i86p.e0a (paradidometha, "w e hand  our­
selves over") is in the m iddle voice, the vo luntary  quality  of Paul's suffering finds 
further em phasis.53 The philanthropic aspects of Paul's hardsh ips come out clearly 
in 4:12: "So then, death is at w ork in  us, b u t life is a t w ork  in you." The them e of 
P aul's vo luntary  enslavem ent to the Corinthian church also appears in 4:15, in 
w hich he asserts that all things he does are for its sake.
In 4:16-5:5, Paul's hardships no longer em phasize the enslavem ent them e but 
underscore his spiritual transform ation. The renew al of P aul's inner self is treated 
in 4:16-17, w hile the renew al of his ou ter self is expressed in  5 :l-5 .51 In both cases, 
Paul calls upon, yet also modifies, the philosophic them e of hardships as the 
sage 's train ing in  virtue. The them e of training is present in 4:17 w hen Paul claims 
that affliction produces glory. Yet hardships prepare a future w eight of glory, not 
a sage trained and  perfected in reason. Paul m odifies the philosophic topos by 
stressing the eschatological dim ension of the transform ation that God is w orking 
in him. He does no t yet possess the transform ed self bu t points to G od's daily re­
new al of his inner self and G od's preparation of an  eternal dw elling (cf. Phil 3:12- 
14). By stressing progress instead of perfection, Paul distinguishes him self from
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the notion in the philosophic tradition that bold speech derived from the m oral 
superiority  of the sage.
We turn to the last hardship  list in 2 Cor 1-7. In 6:3-10, Paul uses a list of hard ­
ships to com m end him self to the Corinthians.55 Again, we see that Paul is no t sat­
isfied sim ply to reproduce a philosophic topos. In addition to the hardships that 
Paul enum erates in 6:4-5, 7b-10, w hich portray  him  as courageous and steadfast, 
we find terms in 6:6-7a that seem  anom alous: "by purity, knowledge, patience, 
kindness, holiness of spirit, genuine love, truthful speech, and the pow er of 
God. . . ."  These term s m ake sense if they are view ed in light of the Greco-Roman 
psychagogical tradition.56 The phrases "tru thfu l speech" and "genuine love" refer 
to frank speech. Paul describes himself, the servant of God, as a bold speaker.57 
P aul's creativity here consists of introducing insights from philosophic soul-care 
about the w ay m oral criticism is to be applied to avoid excessive grief.
The notion of excessive grief is present in 6:3, although m odern  translations 
and exegesis obscure it. The nrsv reads: "We are pu tting  no obstacle [7tpoCTK07tfiv, 
proskopen] in anyone's way, so that no fault m ay be found w ith  our ministry." Ex- 
egetes have incorrectly regarded the term  7ipooKonq as equivalent to JipoaKoppa 
(proskomma, "obstacle").58 A very different understand ing  emerges, however, if 
TtpoaKOTtfi is seen in contexts associated w ith  bold speech. In these instances, it 
designates arousal of hatred because of the grief inflicted by m oral rebuke (Poly­
bius 38.4.2-4; Sextus Empiricus, Math. 2.54; Cicero, Antic. 88-89).5<) ripooKOJif) is 
the alienation caused by bold speech (Isocrates, Ep. 9.12; D ionysius of H alicarnas­
sus, Ant. rom. 11.9.1; Ps.-Socrates, Ep. 1.7; Dio Chrysostom, Diod. 4; Lucian, Her- 
mot. 51; A ristides Rhetor, Or. 3.668). If this lexical insight is brought to bear on 6:3, 
then the reason Paul adds the phrase "so that no fault m ay be found w ith  our 
m inistry" becomes clear. According to 5:18-19, Paul's m inistry aim s at reconcilia­
tion. He w ould subvert this purpose if his speech alienated those he aim ed to w in 
over. If his speech only caused suffering, it w ould  be inconsistent w ith  the m in­
istry of reconciliation. In 6:3-10, Paul presents him self as one w ho combines 
w ords of tru th  w ith  kindness and encouragem ent in order not to alienate those 
w hom  he has addressed w ith  bold speech. Yet kindness and patience should not 
be m istaken for timidity, because the hardships he has endured  dem onstrate 
courage.
T h e  P roblem  o f  S uffering  Reconstructed: R om ans 5 : 1 - 1 1 a n d  8 : 1 8 - 3 9
N o passages better dem onstrate Paul's familiarity w ith  philosophic discourse 
concerning hardships and  suffering than Rom 5:1-11 and 8:18-39. Familiarity is 
perhaps too weak a w ord. Paul is so acquainted w ith  the philosophic tradition 
that he uses its com m onplaces effortlessly. Yet Paul m anipulates theses com m on-
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place sayings and  ideas in order to criticize philosophy 's claim about the capac­
ity of the w ise m an to endure suffering. In o ther w ords, Paul both em ploys anti 
subverts the patterned  discourse of philosophy w ith  its confidence in reason to 
conquer hardships.
H e does this for a purpose. In place of virtue or reason as the solution to the 
problem  of suffering, Paul advances the notion of shared suffering. A lthough he 
derives from the philosophic tradition  the idea that friends share joy, suffering, 
and  even death, Paul radically expands the pool of friends to include God, Christ, 
the H oly Spirit, and  all of creation. The controlling im age in these two passages is 
no t the sage, protected from  hardships by his reason, bu t the friend su rrounded  
by friends w ho share all things.
A t first glance, Rom 5:3-4 sim ply reproduces the notion that hardships train 
the sage in  virtue.60 Suffering builds character (see above). Paul w rites, "A nd  not 
only that, bu t w e also boast in our sufferings, know ing that suffering produces 
endurance, and  endurance produces character, and character produces hope . . . "  
Paul recasts this com m onplace philosophical notion in a familiar rhetorical figure, 
climax.61
Yet som e unfam iliar aspects of P aul's argum ent w ould  have frustrated the an­
cient read er 's  expectations. Notice that Paul com pletes the climax in 5:4 by say­
ing that "character produces hope." From the philosophic standpoint, this is an 
odd  conclusion to an  account of the w ay suffering builds character.62 Some 
philosophers regarded hope as a m oral disease, because hope placed happiness 
in externals, over w hich no one has control. Pursuit of externals can only lead to 
sham e (Seneca, Epp: 5.7; 13.13; 23.2; 24.1; 71.14; 99.5,13; 101.4).“  Thus, by in tro­
ducing hope as the product of character, Paul begins his critique of the philo­
sophic view of suffering as the training of reason.
In its place, Paul explores the relationship betw een friendship and  suffering. 
I m ust poin t ou t the w ays Paul w orks the friendship m otif into the argum ent as a 
replacem ent of philosophic reason. In 5:5 w e read that hope is secure, "because 
the love of God has been poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit that has 
been given to us." The putative exegetical dilem m a that w ould force a decision 
w hether "love of G od" is an  objective genitive (the love w e have for God) or a 
subjective genitive (God's love for us) likely is a false problem . The central m eta­
phor of the sentence, love as a liquid, suggests a m utuality  of love. The idea of 
love as a liquid poured into the heart is found in  am atory literature. It depicts the 
beloved as the source of the lover's affection.64 If Paul is using this notion of m u­
tual love, then the reason w hy hope is secure and can replace reason in the face of 
hardships becomes clear: friendship w ith  G od m eans a m utual sharing of suffer­
ing and joy. Paul has already alluded to this sharing in 5:2 w hen he boasts on the 
hope of sharing the glory of God.
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In 5:6-8, Paul reiterates the them e of friendship and suffering from a differ­
ent angle: "For while we were still weak, at the right time Christ died for the u n ­
godly. Indeed, rarely will anyone die for a righteous person—though perhaps for 
a good person som eone m ight actually dare to die. But God proves his love for us 
in that w hile we still were sinners Christ died for us." This verse echoes the philo­
sophic idea that the ultim ate proof of friendship w as to undergo hardships and 
even to die for the friend. Paul construes Jesus' death  for others in just this way. 
Notice also that Jesus' death also dem onstrates G od 's love (5:8). There are som e 
im portant distinctions, however, w hich set Paul's argum ent apart from  the usual 
discussion of this matter. The philosophers were careful to p u t a lim it on friend­
ship. Friendship is possible only betw een the v irtuous (see above). Jesus (and by 
implication God) violates this canon of friendship. Jesus dies for the weak, sin­
ners, and enemies.
The final w ay Paul w orks the friendship m otif into the argum ent is the re­
peated use of KaxaAA&aaeiv (katallassein) in 5:9-11. This term , translated som e­
w hat m isleadingly as "to reconcile," does not sim ply m ean the cessation of 
animosity, although this is the w ay com m entators invariably regard it. The term 
regularly referred to the establishm ent of friendship (Aristotle, Eth. nic. 8.6.7; Dio 
Chrysostom, Meow. 11,41,47-48), and  w ith  friendship comes the notion of shar­
ing all things. Thus, w e have come again to the po in t that began the passage: 
Paul's confidence resides in  his hope of sharing G od 's glory. Paul does no t take 
the ph ilosopher's approach of view ing suffering as the occasion to display or to 
train hum an  reason. In the last analysis, hum an  suffering is a test of divine friend­
ship. Will the sharing betw een suffering hum anity  and  God be complete? If there 
is to be a hum an boasting in G od 's glory will there also be G od 's participation in 
hum an suffering?
Rom ans 8:18-39 m akes the case for divine participation in hum an suffering. 
This passage takes up  the issue of suffering, as the opening verse clearly indicates: 
"I consider that the sufferings of this present time are not w orth  com paring w ith 
the glory about to be revealed to us." There are num erous parallels between 
8:18-39 and 5:1-11. The m ost obvious is the hardsh ip  lists in 8:35-39 that rem ind 
the reader of 5:3-4:
W ho will separate [ycoploei, chdrisei] us from the love of Christ? Will hard ­
ship, or distress, or persecution, or famine, or nakedness, or peril, or 
sw ord? As it is w ritten, "For your sake w e are being killed all day  long; 
w e are accounted as sheep to be slaughtered." No, in all these things we 
are m ore than conquerors [wtepviKCopev, hypemikomen] through him  w ho 
loved us. For I am  convinced that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor 
rulers, nor things present, nor things to come, nor pow ers, nor height, nor 
depth , nor anything else in all creation, will be able to separate [xcopfocu, 
chorisai] us from  the love of God in  Christ Jesus our Lord.
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The item s in the first list (8:35) are typical of the dangers endured by the wise 
m an. The provocative aspect of both  lists, however, is their rhetorical function. 
N either list w orks in  any of the three w ays hardsh ips w ere used in the ancient d is­
course about the w ise m an. Virtue is neither d isplayed nor trained here, nor is the 
philan thropy  of Paul and  his readers exhibited. Paul is pu tting  these hardship  
lists to a novel use, and  w hat he  does not say about suffering m ight have seem ed 
to his hearers to have as m uch im portance as w ha t he d id  say.
The novelty of P aul's use of these hardsh ip  lists is that he pu ts them  in the 
context of friendship. Instead of calling attention to an  ind iv idual's  v irtue or p h i­
lanthropy, the lists nam e the things that cannot separate Paul and  his readers from 
the love of God. Paul m entions separation twice (8:35, 39) thus pu tting  his hear­
ers in m ind of a problem  often treated in discussions of friendship (Aristotle, Eth. 
nic. 8.5.1; Plutarch, Amic. mult. 95A; Seneca, Ep. 55.8-11; 63.3). Separation w as the 
greatest grief friends m ight suffer. Yet there w as comfort. Even w hen physically 
absent from  one another, friends w ere inseparable, because they w ere one soul in 
tw o bodies. H ardships in P aul's hands, then, serve the rhetorical purpose of re­
constructing the problem  of suffering. Suffering is not the occasion for the display 
or the training of v irtue as w ould  have been the case for Stoics and indeed for 
m uch of the Greco-Rom an w orld. For Paul, hardships produce or exhibit nothing 
in themselves; rather, and  simply, hardsh ips do not obstruct the friendship am ong 
God, Paul, and his hearers.
Paul further challenges the understand ing  of suffering in the philosophic tra­
dition w hen he em ploys the phrase "w e are m ore than conquerors [tmepviKcouev, 
hypernikomen] through him  w ho loved us." To understand  w hy this is a challenge, 
w e need first to appreciate the claim the victory m otif m akes for the suprem acy 
of reason in the face of m isfortune. The victory m otif w as a popular m etaphor in 
the philosophic portrayal of the wise m an 's superiority  to hardships. The wise 
m an conquers hardships (Seneca, Dial. 1.2.2; 2.10.4; Polyb. 17.1-2; Elelv. 2.2), while 
he him self is invincible (aviKrixog, aniketos; Ps.-Diogenes, Ep. 33; Epictetus, Diatr. 
1.18.21-23; Ench. 19.2; Seneca, Ep. 85.29; Vit. beat. 4.2; Elelv. 5.5). Fortune van ­
quishes lesser souls (Seneca, Helv. 1.1). Both m ilitary and athletic victory served 
as a point of com parison for the sage's indom itable soul.65 The victory could be 
over external dangers or over one's ow n passions.66 Seneca, w ho used the m eta­
phor extensively,67 ends a discourse on suffering like Paul w ith  the rhetorical 
flourish supplied  by the victory motif:
And w hen will it be our privilege to despise both kinds of misfortune? 
W hen will it be our privilege, after all the passions have been subdued  
and brought under our control, to u tter the w ords "I have conquered 
[vici]l"7 Do you ask me w hom  1 have conquered [vicerim]? N either the 
Persians, nor the far-off Medes, nor the w arlike race that lies beyond the
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Dahae; not these, bu t greed, am bition, and the fear of death that has con­
quered the conquerors of the w orld [qui victores gentium vicit]. (Seneca, Ep. 
71.37)
The m otif em phasized the im portance of placing all of one's hopes in oneself and 
not in others (Ceb. Tab. 22-24; Seneca, Vit. beat. 8.3). It also pointed to the capacity 
of reason to protect the self from every m isfortune (Cicero, Tusc. 5.52-54; Seneca, 
Epp. 9.18-19; 78.15-21; Dial. 2.5.7; 2.6.6).
Paul seems to affirm the philosopher's confidence in reason by introducing 
the victory m otif into a discussion of hardships. Nevertheless, he dism antles the 
philosophic view in tw o ways. First, he claims that "w e are more than conquerors" 
(emphasis added), im plying that the m etaphor of victory over suffering m ay not 
be adequate. Second, victory over suffering comes not through an individual's 
use of reason bu t through friendship w ith  God: "w e are more than  conquerors 
through him  w ho loved us" (8:37). If anything is clear about the ph ilosopher's  use 
of the victory motif, it is this: the individual soul has w ithin itself all that is nec­
essary to overcome suffering. Victory through ano ther's  agency w ould  have ap­
peared ludicrous and an insult to the providence of God, w ho saw  fit to place a 
fragm ent of divine reason in every hum an soul.
If Rom 8:35-39 is the high point of Paul's attem pt to reconstruct the problem  
of suffering from the perspective of friendship, then Rom 8:18-34 builds up  to this 
conclusion by advocating the pow er of a friend 's sym pathy (taken in the strong 
sense of co-suffering) to console the sufferer.68 In these verses, Paul explores the 
consolation of friendship as an alternative to the philosophic m ethod of dealing 
w ith  suffering through rational control.69 He portrays four agents as friends w ho 
share all things w ith hum an sufferers: creation (8:19-22), the Spirit (8:26), God 
(8:31-33), and Christ (8:34). Space allows only for developing the them e of shared 
suffering in term s of creation and the Spirit.
In 8.T9-22, creation is conceptualized as a person w ith em otions desiring to 
share both in hum anity 's future freedom  and in its present suffering. In short, cre­
ation is a friend:
For the creation w aits w ith  eager longing for the revealing of the children 
of God; for the creation w as subjected to futility, not of its ow n will but 
by the will of the one w ho subjected it, in hope that the creation itself will 
be set free from its bondage to decay and will obtain the freedom  of the 
glory of the children of God. We know  that the whole creation has been 
groaning in labor pains [awTevo^ei Kai awcoStvei, systenazei kai synodi- 
nei] until now.70
Paul draw s upon motifs found in Greek literature and philosophy to portray  the 
friendship of creation w ith  hum ans. W hile for some m odern readers it m ay be
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rem iniscent of the opening chapters of Genesis and  the developm ent of biblical 
them es in  Jew ish apocalyptic thought,71 natu re 's  subjection to futility and its 
bondage to decay w as a stock them e in consolation philosophy (Philo, Cher. 77- 
78; Ps.-Crates, Ep. 35; Plutarch, [Cons. Apoll.] 104C-106C, 112D; Cicero, Tusc. 3.58- 
61; Seneca, Ep. 71.11-16; Polyb. 1.1-4; M enander Rhetor, nepi eniSetKXiKcov 2.9).72 
It w as though t that those grieving m ight derive som e encouragem ent from the 
thought that all existing things m ust of necessity suffer and  perish.
The second motif is decidedly no t from philosophical sources. The character­
ization of nature or an  aspect of nature as a person in sym pathy w ith  hum an suf­
fering is an  ancient literary figure know n in m odern  parlance as the pathetic fal­
lacy.73 "G roan (crteveiv, stenein)," and  "be in anguish (cbSiveiv, odinein)," were 
frequently em ployed in instances of the pathetic fallacy to com m unicate natu re 's  
sym pathy and  m ourning for hum an  suffering (Greek Anthology 7.10,142, 241, 268, 
292, 328, 393, 468, 476, 481, 547, 549, 599, 633; 8.3; Bion, Epitaph. Adon. 35).74 Cre­
ation is a friend, groaning over hum anity 's suffering, subject to the sam e futility, 
yet hoping to share in the sam e freedom  and  glory.
In 8.26, we discover th a t the Spirit also groans. This is a rem arkable statem ent, 
b u t fits w ith  the overall purpose of the passage to assert the shared sufferings of 
friends as an  alternative to consolation through rational self-control. The m oral 
philosophers condem ned groaning (oxeyayiioq, stenagmos) as a sign of weakness 
and the lack of reason (Plutarch, [Cons. Apoll.] 113A; Epictetus, Diatr. 2.6.16-17). 
No good m an ever groans (Epictetus, Diatr. 1.1.12, 22; 1.6.29). It is a disgrace to 
groan (Cicero, Tusc. 2.30-33). Groaning m ust be resisted (Cicero, Tusc. 2.42-50). 
Paul, on  the other hand, m akes this particularly acute form of grief part of the 
Spirit's experience.75 The Spirit shares hum an groaning and is therefore in solidar­
ity w ith  hum anity. G od 's friendship w ith  hum anity  is im plied in suffering the 
loss of the Son, or more accurately, in handing the Son over to death  (8:32). Finally, 
the circle of friends is com pleted. As in the case of 5:6-8, C hrist's friendship is 
dem onstrated through his death for others (8:34; see above). Paul's reconstruction 
of the problem  of suffering is finished. He has em ployed rhetorical forms and 
com m onplace ideas associated w ith philosophy's confidence that reason con­
quers suffering. Yet he has disarm ed that confidence. In place of the virtue of self- 
control, he has advocated the shared suffering of friends, and the circle of Paul's 
friends includes all of creation and the divine community.
P art III. O ther Relevant Pauline and Paulinist Texts
Rom 2:9,15; 7:24; 8:1.7; 9:1-3; 12:12,15, 21; 15:1-3, 30
1 Cor 4:9-12, 21; 5:2; 7:35; 12:25-26; 13:3; 15:30-33
2 Cor 2:12-16; 5:14-21; 8:2; 11:23-33; 12:7-10; 12:21
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Gal 6:2 
Phil 3:18
1 Thess 1:6; 2:1-2, 7-8,13-16; 3:3-5; 4:13-18; 5:8,14
2 Thess 1:4-10 
Col 1:24
Eph 3:13; 6:10-17
1 Tim 1:18-20; 4:10
2 Tim 1:8-2:13; 3:10-13; 4:6-8
P art IV. Bibliography
Classical, H e llen is tic , a n d  G reco-R om an
Braund, S. M., and  C. Gill, eds. The Passions in Roman Thought and Literature. Cam ­
bridge: Cam bridge University Press, 1997.
Buller, J. L. "The Pathetic Fallacy in Hellenistic Pastoral." Ramus 10 (1981): 35-52. 
Fowler, R. L. "The Rhetoric of D esperation." HSCP 91 (1987): 6-38. 
Glibert-Thirry, A. Pseudo-Andronicus De Rhodes: I1EPI TIA0S1N. C orpus latinum  
com m entariorum  in aristotelem  graecorum . Supplem ent 2. Leiden: Brill, 
1977.
Gregg, R. C. Consolation Philosophy: Creek and Christian Paideia in Basil and the Two 
Gregories. Patristic M onograph Series 3. Cam bridge, Mass.: Philadelphia Pa­
tristic Foundation, 1975.
Hoistad, R. Cynic Hero and Cynic King. Lund, Sweden: Carl Blom, 1948.
Johann, H.-T. Trailer und Trost: Line quellen- und strukturanalytische Untersuchung 
der philosophischen Trostschriften iiber Tod. Studia et Testamonia Antiqua 5. M u­
nich: Wilhelm Fink, 1968.
Perkins, J. The Suffering Self: Pain and Narrative Representation in the Early Christian 
Era. N ew York: Routledge, 1995.
Strubbe, J. H. M. "Epigram s and Consolation Decrees for Deceased Youth." L'An- 
tiquite classique 67 (1998): 45-75.
N e w  Testam en t
Fitzgerald, John T. Cracks in an Earthen Vessel: An Examination of the Catalogues of 
Hardships in the Corinthian Correspondence. SBLDS 99. Atlanta: Scholars Press, 
1988.
Glad, C. E. Paul and Philodemus: Adaptability in Epicurean and Early Christian Psych- 
agogy. NovTSup 81. Leiden: Brill, 1995.
M alherbe, A. J. Paul and the Popular Philosophers. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1989.
--------- . Paul and the Thessalonians: The Philosophic Tradition of Pastoral Care.
Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987.
Talbert, C. H. Learning through Suffering: The Educational Value of Suffering in the 
Neio Testament and in Its Milieu. Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 1991.
192 P aul in  the G reco-R om an  W orld
N otes
1. A. Glibert-Thirry, Pseudo-Andronicus De Rhodes: FIEPI TIA0QN (Corpus lat- 
inum  com m entariorum  in aristotelem  graecorum , Supplem ent 2; Leiden: Brill, 
1977), 223.
2. Cicero lim ited the topic in the sam e way. See A. Erskine, "Cicero and the 
Expression of Grief," in The Passions in Roman Thought and Literature (ed. S. M. 
Braund and  C. Gill; Cam bridge: Cam bridge U niversity Press, 1997), 41-42.
3. See M. Pohlenz, Die Stoa (2d ed.; 2 vols.; Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ru- 
precht, 1959), 1:149; 2:77.
4. Philo (Leg. 3.111) cites w hat appears to have been a standard  definition: 
"groaning is intense and  excessive sorrow  [A,wtr|, hype]." Unless otherw ise ind i­
cated, texts and translations of ancient w orks are from the Loeb Classical Library.
5. If w e associate soul shrinkage w ith  grief, we are more likely to recognize 
allusions to em otional pain  in Paul's letters. In addition to the w ords w ith  the root 
sten, contraction of soul is present in the following term s in the Pauline epistles; 
note, however, that the English translations provided by the various m odern ver­
sions (the nrsv is cited here) fail to convey the physiological aspect of the em o­
tion: "affliction" (0\u|/i£, thlipsis; e.g., Rom 5:3; 8:35; 2 Cor 1:4, 6, 8; 2:4); "anguish  
of heart" (ouvoyf) rapSfac;, synoche kardias; 2 Cor 2:4); "faint-hearted" (cAr/ovi/nyo^, 
oligopsychos; 1 Thess 1:14).
6. Glibert-Thirry, Pseudo-Andronicus De Rhodes, 227, m y translation.
7. See A. C. van Geytenbeek, Musonius Rufus and Greek Diatribe (Wijsgerige 
Teksten en  Studies 8; Assen, the N etherlands: Van Gorcum , 1963), 138. See also 
Plato, Gorg. 472D-479D; Isocrates, Nic. 53; Juvenal, Sat. 13.192-198.
8. See H. Deku, "Selbstbestrafung: M arginalien zu einem  sehr alten, aber 
noch nicht ganz lexikonreifen Begriff," Archiv fur Begriffsgeschichte 21 (1977): 42-
58. See also Epictetus, Diatr. 2.22.35; Ench. 34; C lem ent of Alexandria, Strom. 
2.12.55; M arcus Aurelius, 8.53; 12.16; Lucian, Merc. cond. 42; 1 John 3:19-22.
9. John T. Fitzgerald, Cracks in an Earthen Vessel: An Examination of the Cata­
logues of Hardships in the Corinthian Correspondence (SBLDS 99; Atlanta: Scholars 
Press, 1988). Critics of Fitzgerald underestim ate the pow er of the Greek philo­
sophical tradition on  the Jewish sources that, it is claim ed, w ere m ore of an influ­
ence on Paul. Furtherm ore, they fail to understand  F itzgerald 's m ain contribu­
tion, to show  how  the rhetorical use of hardship lists flowed out of the central 
teachings of the philosophers on  the relation betw een virtue and  endurance. See, 
for example, N. Willert, "The Catalogues of H ardships in the Pauline Correspon­
dence: Background and  Function," in  The Neiv Testament and Hellenistic Judaism 
(ed. P. Borgen and  S. Giversen; Arhus, Denmark: Arhus, 1995), 217-43.
10. Fitzgerald, Cracks in an Earthen Vessel, 115.
11. Ibid., 51-55.
12. See J. Perkins, The Suffering Self: Pain and Narrative Representation in the 
Early Christian Era (New York: Routledge, 1995), 77-98.
13. Fitzgerald, Cracks in an Earthen Vessel, 55-70.
14. See N. C. Croy, Endurance in Suffering: Hebreios 12.1-13 in Its Rhetorical, Re­
ligious, and Philosophical Context (SNTSMS 98; Cam bridge: C am bridge U niversity 
Press, 1999), 139-59.
P a u l, H a r d s h ip s , a n d  S u ffe r in g 193
15. See R. H oistad, Cynic Hero and Cynic King (Lund, Sweden: Carl Blom, 
1948), 97. For the readiness of the wise m an to suffer indignities for the good of 
others, see A ntisthenes,/rys. 14.5-6; 15.5, 9. See H. D. Rankin, Antisthenes Sokrati- 
kos (Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1986), 168-70.
16. For the dangers faced by bold speakers, see Lucian, Pise. 20; Peregr. 32. See 
A. Malherbe, Paul and the Popular Philosophers (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1989), 38.
17. See H oistad, Cynic Hero, 195-96.
18. For Cynic misanthropy, see G. A. Gerhard, Phoinix von Kolophon: Texte und 
Untcrsuchungen (Leipzig: Teubner, 1909), 39,165-67,170-75.
19. Ps.-Hippocrates, Ep. 17.40 (in R. Hercher, Epistolographi Graeci [Amster­
dam: Hakkert, 1965], 303).
20. See Gerhard, Phoinix von Kolophon, 32-45.
21. See A. M alherbe, Paul and the Thessalonians: The Philosophic Tradition of Pas­
toral Care (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987), 21-28.
22. For the Epicurean care of souls, see C. E. Glad, Paul and Philodenius: Adapt­
ability in Epicurean and Early Christian Psychagogy (NovTSup 81; Leiden: Brill, 
1995), 101-81. Note the em phasis on reason, truth, and bold speech in Lucian's 
(Alex. 47) account of the Epicurean path  to tranquillity; no m ention is m ade of a 
conversion involving pain, leading in turn  to repentance.
23. See I. H adot, Seneca und die griechisch-romische Tradition der Seelenleitung 
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1969), 71-78.
24. See H. G. Ingenkam p, Plutarchs Schriften iiber die Heilung der Seele (Hypom - 
nem ata 34; Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1971), 74-90.
25. Ps.-Libanius, Charact. Ep. 43. Text and translation is A. M alherbe, Ancient 
Epistolary Theorists (SBLSBS 19; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988), 72-73.
26. For expressions of grief as m oral condem nation in the philosophic trad i­
tion, see the Cynic appropriation of Heraclitus and the philosophers w ho imi­
tated his gloominess: Ps.-Heraclitus, Epp. 5.3; 7.2-10; Lucian, Demon. 6; Vit. auct. 7; 
Fug. 18.
27. For o ther examples of the grieving style, see Julian, Ep. 68; Gregory of 
N azianzus, Epp. 7 ,16; Basil, Epp. 45,156, 204, 207, 212, 223, 224, 270.
28. Mertandri sententiae 370. In the sam e w ork w e read, "Suppose all the bur­
dens of friends to be in com m on" (534), and, "W hen a friend suffers w ith a friend 
he suffers w ith himself" (803; m y translations; see also 543K).
29. Both Plato (Symp. 179B-180B) and Seneca (Ep. 9.10-12) recognize blurring 
in the distinction betw een friendship and  erotic love w hen it comes to dying for 
a friend.
30. S. Farron, Vergil's Aeneid: A Poem of Love and Grief (Leiden: Brill, 1993), 19n. 5.
31. See C. K. Barrett, "O AAIKHEAS (2 Cor 7.12)," in Verborum Veritas: Fest­
schrift fiir Gustav Stdhlin (ed. O. Bocher and I<. Haacker; W uppertal, Germany: 
Theologischer Verlag Rolf Brockhaus, 1970), 149-57.
32. V. Furnish, II Corinthians (AB 32A; G arden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1984), 
54-55,143.
33. Barrett, "O AAIKHZAE," 149-52.
34. For argum ents against identifying the letter w ith  either 1 Corinthians or 
2 Cor 10-13, see Furnish, II Corinthians, 163-68.
35. Ibid., 367-71.
194 P aul in the G reco-R om an  W orld
36. D. Fredrickson, " n ap prja ia  in the Pauline Epistles," in Friendship, Flatten/, 
and Frankness of Speech: Studies on Friendship in the Nezv Testament World (ed. J. Fitz­
gerald; NovTSup 82; Leiden: Brill, 1996), 180.
37. Ancient exegetes view ed en rap fa  here as e7tm|J.r|ai<; and thus an  aspect of 
m oral exhortation. See, for example, Chrysostom , Horn. 4 in 2 Cor. 4 (PG 61.422).
38. For the goals of m oral exhortation, and rebuke in particular, see Fladot, 
Seneca und die griechisch-romische Tradition der Seelenleitung, 168-69. Philodem us 
(Lib. 31, 82, XXIVA) understands eitrapriau; as a form  of frank speech.
39. See A. M alherbe, " 'Pastoral Care' in  the Thessalonian Church," NTS 36 
(1990): 381-85.
40. For rebuke leading to sham e and suicide, see Plutarch, Adul. amic. 70F-71C.
41. R. L. Fowler ("The Rhetoric of D esperation," HSCP 91 [1987]: 6-38) has 
identified a rhetorical form  em ployed from  H om er to Rom an times, w hich he has 
nam ed "desperation  speech." Its identifying m arks include indication of the ex­
trem e w eight of suffering borne by the speaker, the im possibility of a solution 
(atiopfa, aporia), questioning w hether life is any longer possible, not know ing 
w hether to chose life or death, and an exclam ation about how  w retched one has 
become (parodied in Epictetus, Diatr. 1.12.27). In addition to 2 Cor 1:8, tw o other 
passages in Paul fit this form  very well: Rom 7:24-25 and Phil 1:21-26. Fowler 
(27-31) calls attention to the fact that Euripides introduces the sym pathy of 
friends as a solution to the aporia of the speaker. Similarly, Paul introduces the no­
tion of friendship in each instance of his use of desperation speech.
42. Friends have like em otions (see Plutarch, Adul. amic. 51E; Amic. mult. 97A). 
Friendship comes into being through likeness, and this includes the identity  of 
em otions (see Aristotle, Eth. nic. 83.6-7 ; Plutarch, Amic. mult. 96E-F; Cicero, 
Amic. 50).
43. D. Fredrickson, "Paul's Sentence of Death (2 Corinthians 1:9)," in Cod, 
Evil, and Suffering: Essays in Honor of Paul R. Sponheim (ed. T. Fretheim  and  
C. Thom pson; Word and  W orld Supplem ent Series 4; St. Paul, Minn.: W ord & 
World, 2000), 103-7.
44. "W orldly grief" recalls P aul's description in 2:7 of the grief suffered by 
" the  one w ho  caused injury."
45. For the role of em otional pain  or grief in G od 's intention to bring about 
m oral reform, see Plutarch, Sera 549F-550A; 550E-F; 551C-E. Cf. Philo, Det. 144- 
146; Conf. 180-182; Somn. 1.91; H eb 12:10-11; Rev 3:19.
46. O ther interpreters (e.g., C. K. Barrett, The Second Epistle to the Corinthians 
[BNTC; London: Black, 1973], 203; Furnish, II Corinthians, 369) regard this phrase 
as P au l's  attem pt to m itigate the severity of the previous denials (7:2), w hich they 
view  as his accusations against the church.
47. See G erhard, Phoinix von Kolophon, 36.
48. For the soul as treasure, see Philo, Leg. 3.104-106; Cher. 48; Det. 35,43; Deus 
42, 91-93; Sobr. 41,68; Conf. 69; Plutarch, An. corp. 500D; Seneca, Ep. 92.31-32. Bar­
rett (Second Epistle to the Corinthians, 137) gives good reasons to believe that Paul 
is alluding to his illum ined soul; in the end, however, like o ther interpreters he 
does not come to this conclusion for fear of tu rn ing  Pau l's  anthropology over to 
Hellenistic ideas about the body and  soul. For Paul's ability to m anipulate philo­
sophic terminology, see n. 54 below.
P a u l, H a r d s h ip s , a n d  S u ffe r in g 195
49. So Fitzgerald, Cracks in Earthen Vessels, 167-69.
50. See H. B. Walters, History of Ancient Pottery: Greek, Etruscan, and Roman 
(2 vols.; London: Murray, 1905), 1:135-36; 2:455, 479. Cf. Rom 9:21 and esp. 
2 Tim 2:20.
51. The pow er of God to give life through Paul's m inistry is the them e of 5:12. 
Cf. 2 Cor 1:6; Gal 3:5; Phil 2:13; 1 Thess 2:13. For a sim ilar notion, in the philo­
sophic tradition, of divine power, see Dio Chrysostom , Alex. 15.
52. Fitzgerald, Cracks in Earthen Vessels, 169-76. Fitzgerald believes, however, 
that the divine pow er in Paul's weakness in 4:8-9 is "one of the w ays in w hich the 
C orinthians are to know  that he has been com m issioned by God and the w ord 
that he speaks comes from God (172)." I w ould  assert that Paul distinguishes him ­
self from the popular conception of the philosopher, w hose claim to authority  
rested on his ow n power.
53. So ibid., 180.
54. For Paul's use and critique in 2 Cor 4:16-5:5 of philosophic com m onplaces 
such as "body as tem porary dwelling" and  "death  as stripping the soul of the 
body," see D. Fredrickson, "Paul Playfully on  Time and Eternity," Dialog 39 (2000): 
21-23. For these com m onplaces incorporated into discussions of hardships and 
suffering, see Seneca, Epp. 24.17-21; 92.30-35; 102.21-30; 120.13-19.
55. The view that 6:3-10 is apologetic has been challenged w ith  good reason 
by Fitzgerald (Cracks in Earthen Vessels, 187-88). He has dem onstrated  (191-201) 
that 6:3-10 reflects the philosophic use of hardships to depict the sage's courage 
and constancy. I disagree, however, w ith his view  that Paul's self-com m endation 
fosters his hearers' confidence in him. Something m ore specific is a t stake, 
namely, the integrity of the flexible approach to the care of souls suggested in 
6:6-7. The constancy of Paul portrayed in 6:7-10 guards against any accusation 
that his gentleness is flattery. For the them e of adaptability in the care of souls, see 
Glad, Paul and Philodemus, 15-98.
56. Fredrickson, "riappriofa in the Pauline Epistles," 179-80.
57. Ibid., 179.
58. See, for example, R. M artin, 2 Corinthians (WBC 40; Waco, Tex.: Word 
Books, 1986), 170-71.
59. For the sense of hatred, see SVF 3.102.40; Cicero, Tusc. 4.23-24; 4.26; Sen­
eca, Ep. 14.7.
60. Substitute "Christian" for "sage" and you have Paul's meaning. So C. FI. 
Talbert, Learning through Suffering: The Educational Value of Suffering in the Nczv Tes­
tament and in Its Milieu (Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical, 1991), 21-22.
61. J. Wettstein, Novum Testamentum Graecum (2 vols.; Am sterdam : Ex officina 
Dom m eriana, 1752; reprint, Graz, Germany: Akadem ische Druck- und Verlagsan- 
stalt, 1962), 46.
62. A sim ilar surprise aw aits the reader in 1 Thess 5:8. The "arm or of the sage" 
constructed out of reason was a w idespread philosophic motif. See M alherbe, 
Paul and the Popular Philosophers, 95-103. Paul subverts the image, however, by 
constructing the arm or ou t of faith, love, and  hope. These m ake a person vulner­
able to realities external to the soul. Paul's earliest interpreters were no t so eager 
to abandon reason. N ote the m ore conventional construction of arm or in Eph 
6:10-17 and 1 Tim 1:18.
196 P a u l  in  t h e  G r e c o - R o m a n  W o r ld
63. Nevertheless, Paul's appeal to hope in affliction has parallels. For exam ­
ple, M enander (813K) w rites, "In adversity a m an is saved by hope." Does Rom 
8:24a echo this saying? Cicero (Amic. 23, 59) believes that friendship provides 
hope for the future and does not let the spirit grow faint. This connection betw een 
friendship and hope is crucial for Rom 5 and  8.
64. See notes by M. Davies, Hermes 111 (1983): 496-97, and O. Vox, Hermes 120 
(1992): 375-76. For additional examples, see D. Sider, The Epigrams of Philodemus: 
Introduction, Text, and Commentary (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 
95-97.
65. A thletic victory: Ps.-Diogenes, Ep. 31; Epictetus, Diatr. 1.24.1-2; 3.25.1-6; 
4.4.30-32; Philo, Agr. 110-21; Mut. 82.1; Prob. 26-27, 110-12. M ilitary victory: 
Ps.-D iogenes, Ep. 5; and  m ost of the instances in Seneca, including Polyb. 15.3; 
16.3.
66. Victory over external hardships: Seneca, Epp. 98.12, 14; 104.27. Victory 
over passions: SVF 3.129.9; Ps.-Heraclitus, Ep. 4.3; Philo, Abr. 48-49; Epictetus, 
Erich. 34. External and  internal are brought together in Ps.-Diogenes, Ep. 12; Ci­
cero, Tusc. 2.63.
67. For a brief account, see C. E. M anning, On Seneca's "Ad Marciam" (Leiden: 
Brill, 1981), 62. Seneca reserves the victory m otif for a final flourish in Ep. 67, a d is­
course on the endurance of hardships.
68. Com pared w ith  the other techniques for m itigating em otional pain, w hich 
focused on the irrationality of grief, a friend 's sym pathy w as a little-utilized 
them e in Greco-Roman consolatory literature. See J. FI. D. Scourfield, Consoling 
Heliodorus: A Commentary on ]erome, Letter 60 (New York: Oxford U niversity Press, 
1992), 81. A few exam ples can be located: Plutarch, [Cons. Apoll.] 102A; Seneca, 
Polyb. 12.2. For the rational therapy of grief in philosophic consolation, see H.-T. 
Johann, Trauer und Trost: Eine quellen- und strukturanalytische Untersuchung derphil- 
osophischen Trostschriften fiber Tod (Studia et Testamonia A ntiqua 5; M unich: Wil­
helm  Fink, 1968), and R. C. Gregg, Consolation Philosophy: Greek and Christian 
Paideia in Basil and the Two Gregories (Patristic M onograph Series 3; Cam bridge, 
Mass.: Philadelphia Patristic Foundation, 1975). O utside of the philosophic w rit­
ings, however, the notion that sharing em otional pain has consolatory pow er ap ­
pears to have been w idespread. See J. FI. M. Strubbe, "Epigram s and Consolation 
Decrees for Deceased Youth," L'Antiquitd classique 67 (1998): 45-75. Stobaeus (Flor. 
5.48.16-31) provides a collection of texts around  this theme.
69. We can be certain that Paul was aw are of the form s of philosophic conso­
lation, since he adopts som e of them. See M alherbe, Paul and the Thessalonians, 57- 
58, and  idem, Paul and the Popular Philosophers, 64-66.
70. The nrsv's "in  labor pains" is too free a translation of ouvcoStvei (synodi- 
nei). The verbal aspect needs to be retained, and it is debatable w hether the birth  
im agery should be given such em phasis. The term  cbStvco (odino) in the sense of "I 
am  in anguish" was em ployed w ith  "I groan" (oTevco, stend) in epitaphs w ithout 
calling attention to birth  imagery. The early association of the term  w ith  birth  pain 
is no indication of actual usage in a later period.
71. O. Christoffersson, The Earnest Expectation of the Creature: The Flood-Tradi­
tion as Matrix of Romans 8:18-27 (ConBNT 23; Stockholm: Alm qvist & Wiksell In­
ternational, 1990), 129-32.
P a u l, H a r d s h ip s , a n d  S u ffe r in g 19 7
72. See Johann, Trailer und Trost, 63-67,119-64.
73. J. L. Buller, "The Pathetic Fallacy in Hellenistic Pastoral," Ramus 10 (1981): 
35-52; J. M. H urw itt, "Palm  Trees and the Pathetic Fallacy in Archaic Greek Po­
etry  and Art," CJ 77 (1982): 193-99; C. Segal, "D issonant Sympathy: Song, O r­
pheus, and the Golden Ages in Seneca's Tragedies," Ramus 12 (1983): 229-51; J. D. 
Reed, Biun of Smyrna: The Fragments and the Adonis (Cam bridge Classical Texts and 
Com m entary 33; Cambridge: C am bridge University Press, 1997), 125, 215-16.
74. N ature 's sym pathy for hum an suffering should not be confused w ith  the 
Stoic doctrine of oupnccGeia (sympatheia), w hich taught the im personal, causal in­
terconnection of all things. See H. R. Neuenschw ander, Mark Aurels Beziehungen 
zu Seneca und Poseidonios (Noctes Rom anae 3; Stuttgart: Paul H aupt, 1951), 14-23.
75. For groaning as a type of grief, see above, n. 4.
